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REVIEW ARTICLE
Six titans of the Cambridge School:
a review article
Harvey Gram*

(Reviewing: Great Thinker in Economics, Series Editor, A. P. Thirlwall, selection consisting of P.
Groenewegen, Alfred Marshall, 2007; P. Davidson, John Maynard Keynes, 2007, 2009; G.
Fletcher, Dennis Robertson, 2008; A. Roncaglia, Piero Sraffa, 2009; G. C. Harcourt and P. Kerr,
Joan Robinson, 2009; J. E. King, Nicholas Kaldor, 2009, Palgrave Macmillan)
Six volumes in the Great Thinker in Economics Series were chosen by the Editors for
this review, which focuses on The Cambridge School of Economics, so very different
from the mainstream theory of general economic equilibrium which gives formal
expression to Lionel Robbins’ famous definition of the subject as the allocation of
scarce means among alternative uses. In recognition of a distinct Cambridge School,
the authors of these volumes present a variety of arguments within which three
overlapping themes can be discerned: the relationship between ethics and
economics; the role of stocks and flows in economic analysis; and the epistemic
problem surrounding the role of creativity, which has eluded the skills of formalists.
The once pervasive influence of Alfred Marshall, John Maynard Keynes, Dennis
Robertson, Piero Sraffa, Joan Robinson and Nicholas Kaldor can only be recovered
with some such set of general themes in mind.
Key words: Role of economists, History of thought: individuals
JEL classifications: A11, B31

1. Introduction
Great Thinkers in Economics, under the general editorship of Professor A. P. Thirlwall is
a welcome series of short intellectual biographies ‘written in a style that makes them of
interest not only to professional economists but also to students of economics and the
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interested lay person’. The interested lay person would surely be surprised to learn, just as
some students are disappointed to find out, that the formal apparatus of modern economic
theory bears no clearly articulated relationship to either morality or ethics—notwithstanding
the sharp distinction some professional economists draw between ‘positive’ and ‘normative’
analysis. Each of the books under review allows the reader to rediscover the ethical and moral
underpinnings of economics. A common analytical thread can also be discerned in the
attention that our six Cambridge economists gave to the relationship between stocks and
flows—conceptual categories central to all economic theories and inextricably bound up
with the passage of time. A final theme for this overview deals tentatively with certain
epistemic questions surrounding the role of creativity, which has eluded the skills of
formalists but which helps the modern reader better to appreciate the lasting contribution of
six of the great thinkers in economics.1

2. Economics as a moral and ethical science
2.1 Marshall
Economics was once a moral science, developing out of Hume’s Principles of Morals and
Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. Marshall’s hard won campaign, beginning in earnest
with his inaugural lecture in 1885, to establish, two decades later in Cambridge, an
Economics and Politics Tripos, separate from Moral Sciences and History was by no
means an effort to remove moral and ethical concerns from the orbit of economics. The
strong line from Mill to Marshall prompts Groenewegen to cite Mill on The Futurity of the
Labouring Class in his discussion of Marshall’s similarly titled 1873 address to the
Cambridge Reform Club: Marshall ‘defined the nature of the working classes in terms of
character, analysed the effect of work on character and then looked at the remedial
influence of education . . . Marshall’s economic studies with respect to the improvement of
the labour force . . . stayed with him for the rest of his life’ (AM, p. 46). Yet, Marshall’s
‘‘‘youthful tendency to socialism’’ to which he confessed in the preface of Industry and Trade
(1919)’ (AM, p. 116) never overcame his wariness of ‘the potential for suppressing
individual energy and freedom to experiment when an industry was dominated by large
trade unions and employers’ organisations’ (AM, p. 91).
It is not surprising that Marshall’s economics was rooted in ethics and an abiding
concern for what he called the ‘standard of life’. He appears easily, if gradually, to have
sloughed off the religious theology of his youth, while endorsing ‘the value of religion more
strongly as he grew older’ (AM, p. 34). Partly, it was a reflection of the times. During the
1860s, ‘reform of church, universities and parliamentary government were high on the
agenda and the conflict between science and religion sharpened considerably’ (AM, p. 30).
Partly, it was a personal rebellion against a tyrannical father (Keynes, 1924[1972], pp.
163–4). Then, too, at about the age that an undergraduate would nowadays be delving into
the mysteries of Marshall’s consumers’ surplus, he himself was witness to the publication of
that great shock to a religious upbringing, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural
Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life. In the year of his birth,
women and children under the age of 10 were, for the first time, prohibited from working
1
In what follows, references to Alfred Marshall are indicated by AM, and likewise for the other volumes, in
the order listed here by date of birth of their subjects: John Maynard Keynes, JMK; Dennis Robertson, DR;
Piero Sraffa, PS; Joan Robinson, JR; Nicholas Kaldor, NK. Other volumes in the series, in particular those on
Pigou, Kalecki and Harrod, have a general bearing on the development of a distinctive Cambridge
economics, but were not included in the selection made by the Editors.
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in the mines; and by the time Marshall’s Principles of Economics first appeared, 48 years
later, the minimum age for work in factories was still nine. With the erosion of the religious
foundation for ethics, economic questions motivated by policy concerns would naturally be
bound up in ethical values.
G. J. Goschen’s presidential address to the British Economic Association in 1893 was
entirely concerned with defending economics against the charge that it had lost touch with
ethics as it embraced a scientific outlook. Marshall, in seconding the vote of thanks
reinforced the message in his folksy style: ‘In early times Ethics did all her own work. But as
she got on in the world, she delegated much of the drudgery to various servants; of whom
Economics was one of the most busy. Ethics now gave herself mainly to the higher
problems of the ultimate basis of duty . . . setting ever higher and higher ideals, as tasks up
to which her servants had to work’ (Marshall, 1893, p. 389). The duty of economists was to
serve ethics.
Marshall’s struggle to separate economics from moral science without losing its ethical
foundation was an integral part of his neoclassical embrace of the classical distinction
between ‘the theory of distribution, where laws varied according to time and place and the
universally applicable general laws of Political Economy’ (AM, p. 39), a separation so
clearly maintained by Mill.

2.2 Keynes
Davidson also comments on this shift in the foundation for values: ‘In Cambridge, at the
end of the nineteenth century, the belief in religion as the predetermination of one’s life and
one’s society was being replaced by the notion that by studying the principles of the ‘‘moral
sciences’’ one could recognise the source of social order and wisdom’ (JMK, p. 4). Keynes,
too, had written that ‘Marshall’s Cambridge career came just at the . . . critical moment at
which Christian dogma fell away from the serious philosophical world of England, or an
any rate of Cambridge’ (Keynes, 1924[1972], p. 168). Shove’s review of Marshall’s
Industry and Trade had already moved on, critical of ‘the excessive ‘‘moral tone’’ of the
work, not appropriate to reporting the ‘‘non-moral science’’ of economics’ (AM, p. 159).
By the time of Keynes’s essay, the seriousness of Marshall’s struggle was on the verge of
being reduced to a psychological tic: ‘Marshall was too anxious to do good . . . to undervalue those intellectual parts of the subject which were not directly connected with
human well-being . . . and to feel that when he was pursuing them he was not occupying
himself with the Highest’ (Keynes, 1924[1972], p. 200). And yet, ‘To Keynes, the
existence of human distress resulting from the inability of the economic system to
persistently generate a fully employed economy, and the gross inequality of income and
wealth under the existing economic system, should not go unheeded. If at all possible,
institutions and policies should be developed to abolish these faults . . .’ (JMK, pp. 1–2).
Citing Harrod (1951, pp. 191–2), Davidson recalls that a year before his death,
Keynes appealed to his own notion of the Highest in offering ‘a toast to ‘‘economics and
economists who are the trustees, not of civilisation, but the possibilities of civilisation’’’
(JMK, p. 3).
Skidelsky (2009) contains a chapter on ‘Keynes and the Ethics of Capitalism’ where it is
remarked that Keynes, the atheist, ‘was close enough to the ‘‘believing’’ generation to feel
the need for ‘‘true’’ beliefs’ (Skidelsky, 2009, p. 136) concerning what is good. In his
search, Keynes was guided by G. E. Moore’s Principia Ethica, published during his first
year as an undergraduate. Skidelsky’s sympathetic and engrossing account of how Keynes
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‘forces us to consider the question of what economic activity is for’ (Skidelsky, 2009,
p. 153) ends by suggesting that Keynes ‘might have been deluding himself’ (Skidelsky,
2009). Davidson takes a more robust line, never wavering from his insistence that the philosophical key to understanding the Keynesian revolution is the relationship between ethics
and uncertainty.2 It is an arresting juxtaposition. What modern student, having swallowed
the assumptions necessary to reduce the unknowable future to a matter of calculable risk,
would ever think that the problem of the Ethics of Capitalism had thereby been shunted to
one side?
Davidson tells the story of how Keynes created ‘a new economic theory to provide an
understanding of an economic system that was able to perpetuate widespread unemployment. . . [and] so set mankind on the road to a more civilized society’ (JMK, pp.
11–12). He notes at the outset the 15 year period during which Keynes’s fellowship
dissertation evolved into his Treatise on Probability, a key to his view of probability as
a branch of logic rather than of mathematics and so the further key to understanding the
importance of irreducible uncertainty in Keynes’s economics.3 In A Tract on Monetary
Reform, ‘Keynes argued that price stability was necessary for contractual predictability,
which in turn promoted economic stability . . . an essential condition for the operation of
a progressive civilizing economic system’ (JMK, p. 15). More than a decade then passed
during which ‘Keynes would struggle to throw off the vestments of the classical theory and
to create his own new taxonomy and revolutionary economic theory’ (JMK, p. 16). Along
the way, he parts company with his long-time colleague, Dennis Robertson, whose
thinking was ‘in many ways, a trailblazer for Keynes’s new ideas [set forth in his Treatise on
Money, but for whom] fluctuations in economic activity . . . were ‘‘real’’ phenomena
independent of the quantity of money and credit [and explained by] ‘‘over-investment in
real plant and equipment’’’ (JMK, p. 17).4 Finally, in The General Theory of Employment,
Interest and Money, now regarded by New Keynesian, Greg Mankiw as ‘an obscure . . .
outdated book’ (JMK, p. 38), Davidson finds the influence of Moore’s Principia Ethica in
Keynes’s realisation ‘that to understand the unemployment problem it was necessary to
develop a precise taxonomy regarding classes of expenditure and saving’ (JMK, p. 42). In
developing this new taxonomy, Keynes comes to recognise one over-riding, insatiable need:
‘In a world of uncertainty, one can never have too much liquidity . . .’ (JMK, p. 54). Fear of
illiquidity is the root cause of the business cycle and all its attendant costs, a fear inherent
in, what Davidson calls, the ‘non-ergodic’ nature of a money-using, market-oriented,
entrepreneurial economy.5 This fear must be addressed by concerted, intelligent, cooperative action designed to mitigate the avoidable costs.
2

Ethics and Uncertainty (Greer, 2000) contrasts Frank Knight’s pessimistic conclusions concerning
the unavoidable costs inflicted on the macro-economy by uncertainty with Keynes’s more optimistic
prognostications.
3
Keynes’s unhappy acceptance of Ramsey’s criticisms of his Treatise on Probability has recently been
addressed by D. Gillies (2006); see also A. Roncaglia (2009).
4
For a discussion of how The General Theory emerged out of critical analysis of the quantity theory during
the 1920s and 1930s, see Laidler (1991). As for the reception of The General Theory, Davidson focuses much
of his attention on the way in which Samuelson embraced a limited interpretation of its main ideas (JMK, pp.
176–85).
5
The professional economist, familiar with dynamic programming will be helped in understanding the
depth of Davidson’s critique of mainstream economics by his reference to Liouville’s Theorem, closely
connected to Hamiltonian mechanics: ‘The intrinsic stability of . . . conservative systems is linked with the
theory of ergodic processes by Liouville’s Theorem’ (JMK, p. 206). Davidson cites a letter from Hicks who
wrote to him: ‘. . .I missed a chance of labeling my own point of view as nonergodic. One needs a name like
that. . .’ (JMK, p. 203, n. 6).
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2.3 Robertson
In Robertson’s ‘work on the relationship between the trade, or business, cycle and
economic growth in a money-using economy . . . cyclical fluctuations were a necessary byproduct of the growth process’ (DR, p. 5). Economic progress presented Robertson with an
ethical problem, recalled by Fletcher (DR, p. 81) in a memorable quotation from A Study of
Industrial Fluctuation (1915, p. 254):
Is the assumption valid upon which western civilisation seems to proceed—that it is desirable so
to manipulate one’s income-stream that it shall flow in with an ever-rising tide? From some points
of view the whole cycle of industrial change presents the appearance of a perpetual immolation
of the present upon the altar of the future. During the boom sacrifices are made out of all
proportion to the enjoyment over which they will ultimately give command: during the
depression enjoyment is denied lest it debar the possibility of making fresh sacrifices. Out of
the welter of industrial dislocation the great permanent riches of the future are generated. How
far are we bound to honour the undrawn bills of posterity, and to acquiesce in this never-closing
hyperbola of intersecular exchange? . . . The question is one of ethics, rather than of economics:
but let us at least remember that we belong to an age which is apt to forget the [‘final cause’]
among the [‘material cause’] and to immolate ourselves, if we must, with our eyes open and not
as in a trance.

These are not the concerns of the modern student of intertemporal optimisation,
oblivious even of those ethical concerns about discounting the future so simply expressed
by that other Cambridge economist whose name is routinely invoked by modern theorists:
‘. . . it is assumed that we do not discount later enjoyments in comparison with earlier ones,
a practice which is ethically indefensible and arises merely from the weakness of the
imagination . . .’ (Ramsey, 1928, p. 543).
Fletcher develops in a subtle and engaging way, over the course of his entire book,
a remarkable thesis concerning the connection between Robertson’s analysis of the
business cycle as a problem with clear ethical overtones and his enduring fascination with
the poetry of Walt Whitman. ‘Consciousness of the reality of death and the means of
coming to terms with it permeates the whole’ (DR, p. 83). Whitman’s lines, ‘Urge and urge
and urge/Always the procreant urge of the world’, were included in the above quotation
and appeared again at the end of the New Introduction to the 1948 edition of A Study of
Industrial Fluctuation, sounding once more the ethical problem that haunted Robertson:
‘‘‘to abolish the trade cycle’’ would be to abolish growth’ (DR, p. 122).

2.4 Sraffa
The ethical content of Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities (Sraffa, 1960),
Roncaglia’s main focus, is not explicitly addressed by him; nor did the author of that
famously slim volume help to shed light on the matter. Perhaps it is obvious that in
establishing new foundations for the classical tradition that follows an arc from Petty to
Marx, Sraffa was developing a framework of analysis in which ethical considerations are
inherent insofar as exchange is required for the reproduction of an economy’s social and
technical relations of production. This is in opposition to exchange viewed simply as a way
to increase the standard of living of an economy’s individual consumers who, among them,
own directly or indirectly all its various ‘factors of production’, but for whom there is no
analytically recognised necessity for social interaction. Indeed, what is most striking about
Sraffa’s analysis is that, unlike the general equilibrium of supply and demand, it does not
associate with each particular list of final outputs a unique distribution of income reflecting
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the relative scarcity of the given inputs with which the outputs are produced at a point
of constrained optimisation. On the contrary, in Sraffa’s analysis, the distribution of
income—and, indeed, the composition of output itself—is left open and in need of
a complementary analysis. This analytical separation, still found in Mill, finds expression
in a ‘core’ of propositions (cf. Garegnani, 1984) outside of which income distribution and
output are to be analysed, a separation that Roncaglia questions only insofar as the ‘core’ is
seen as having priority over, rather than coexistence with ‘the investigation of different
aspects of the functioning of economic systems . . . when distinguishing between different
economic ‘‘visions’’’ (PS, p. 160).
Despite some discussion of the role that Sraffa played in the intellectual development of
Wittgenstein, the place of ethics in such visions is left unexamined. One might therefore
briefly note that Arrow and Hahn (1971) did recognise, within the mainstream vision, an
awkward problem: zero equilibrium income arises for consumers who own only those
factors of production that have zero scarcity value at the margin. Their reason for
proposing an axiom of ‘resource-relatedness’ was to solve a formal difficulty having to do
with discontinuity of demand correspondences, rather than to face up to the ethical
problem of survival within an economy of interacting ‘agents’. By contrast, Sen (1981)
introduced the concept of trade-independent security, stressing ‘the entanglement of Sraffa’s
economics and philosophy. Specifically, he describes the role Sraffa played in persuading
Wittgenstein to turn away from his early formalism and toward a respect for natural
languages, and the possibility that Sraffa was influenced in this matter by his friend
Antonio Gramsci’ (Walsh, 2008, p. 226).

2.5 Robinson
One might expect Joan Robinson, whose subject declared herself a left-wing Keynesian, to
be filled with discussions of the relationship between ethics and economics. For the most
part, Harcourt and Prue have other fish to fry, typified by critical remarks written in
connection with ‘Joan Robinson’s reductionist and deductive approach to Marx and
a theory of capitalist activity’ (JR, p. 40): ‘Because she proceeds to ‘‘translate’’ Marx’s
historical materialism and dialectical reasoning into deductive logic, much is distorted or
lost, the conceptualisation of causality is inverted and its pattern is changed; its relationship
to history is lost’ (JR, p. 41). Further on, they conclude: ‘Her reading of Marx [later
became] far more open-minded and sympathetic . . . [but even then, her appeal to history]
is too glib and reflects her limited interpretation of the nature of abstraction in Marx’s
history’ (JR, p. 53).
In their chapter, ‘Joan Robinson and Socialist Planning’, Harcourt and Prue do make
clear that ethics and reason are inextricably united in her approach to policy. A year after
her 1942 Essay on Marxian Economics, Robinson wrote: ‘a rational society would certainly
not contain the enormous inequalities which exist in capitalist or feudal states, and would
not recognise mere ownership of property as a source of income, but it would have to make
use of differences in income as an incentive to work and to acquire knowledge and skill, so
that complete equality could not be attained’ (JR, p. 71). Nevertheless, it is concluded (in
this period, at least) that Robinson’s ‘theory was separable from politics . . . She chose
political or moral objectives and then developed her theory ‘‘scientifically’’ to produce
policies which would achieve these’ (JR, p. 74). Only later did ‘her dualist approach
ultimately [give] way to a view that theory and ideology were essentially mixed in the
economist’s method’ (JR, p. 75).
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The reader is reminded, with intended approbation, that ‘Joan Robinson always thought
it most important to make explicit what sort of society/economy was implied in theoretical
models: who were the decision-makers, what were the rules of the game, what institutions
were implied, if any?’ (JR, p. 115). And, in a chapter on her views on development
economics, Robinson’s intriguing comment on the ethical problem of ensuring fairness and
providing incentive is singled out: ‘These two purposes are of course not separated because
feelings of fair dealing also provide incentive’ (JR, p. 148). But only in their penultimate
chapter is the relationship between ethics and economics in Robinson’s work taken up in
detail. Arguably the most important of the three books considered, her 1962 Economic
Philosophy, appeared three decades after she announced in a 1932 pamphlet that economics was nothing more than its own technique. Still, that later work does not fully satisfy
Harcourt and Prue who conclude that ‘she did not have the philosophical instruments to
guide her thinking, or to give validity to her arguments. Her lingering positivism interfered
with and limited her theoretical developments, denying her passionately held views on
social justice a status equivalent to what she saw as the ‘‘scientific’’ element of political
economy’ (JR, p. 202; cf. Walsh, 1996, pp. 258–62).

2.6 Kaldor
King recalls that, ‘For conservative economists, utilitarianism had always seemed to carry
a dangerously egalitarian message. . . . One way in which a utilitarian could escape from
egalitarianism was by means of a dogmatic denial of the very possibility that the utility
levels of different individuals could be compared in the first place. This defence of privilege
required an unconvincingly solipsistic approach to the problem of comparing the states of
mind of different individuals. . .’ (NK, p. 23). Kaldor entered the fray with a defence of the
compensation principle in the context of the classical debate over the Corn Laws, but he
concluded his argument on a general note: ‘‘‘All that economics can, and should, do in this
field, is to show, given the pattern of income-distribution desired, which is the most
convenient way of bringing it about’’ (Kaldor, 1939A, p. 552)’ (NK, p. 26). Positing
a desired income distribution independently of the level and composition of output is part
and parcel of an enduring classical tradition within the Cambridge School and thus a basis
for its concern with ethics.
By 1980, Kaldor’s ethical stance towards capitalism had crystallised: ‘‘‘The concentration
on material welfare . . . creates a socially restless and basically frustrated competitive society
which fosters a scale of values that moralists and religions throughout human history have
regarded as reprehensible. . . . it leads . . . to a concentration of power . . . no less distasteful than
state power . . . since it is power without responsibility . . . conferred by the possession of wealth
. . . which makes modern capitalism so unsatisfactory as a method of organisation of human
societies . . .’’ (Kaldor, 1980, p. 10)’ (NK, p. 91). King is critical of Kaldor for failing to
make use of his early work on the economics of welfare, of contributing ‘nothing to the
extensive literature on . . . market socialism, [seeming] to have been entirely unimpressed
by the arguments for economic planning, and . . . [taking] no interest in the analysis of
worker cooperatives, self-managed enterprises and other forms of social ownership. . .’
(NK, pp. 91–2). Still, he reserves some of his best Kaldorian prose for his chapter on ‘The
Scourge of Monetarism’, the title of Kaldor’s 1982 book, which was followed a year later by
The Economic Consequences of Mrs. Thatcher, echoing the title of Keynes’s famous and
unrestrained polemic. Kaldor’s clear understanding of the political consequences of
a successful assault on the evils of unemployment underlay his conclusion that ‘Thatcher
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was serious, and that . . . monetarism itself was increasingly being used as a cover for her
class war’ (NK, p. 152). It was his theoretical position and his understanding of the facts
that provided the foundation for his moral indignation (cf. Putnam and Walsh, 2009).

3. Stocks and flows
The conceptual difference between stocks and flows is bound up with the passage of time. In
mainstream theory, the scarce means in Robbins’s famous definition of economics are all stocks;
whereas, the arguments in utility functions and production functions are all flows. Static
equilibrium is about matching up the flows, but without a clear discussion of their
relationships to stocks, nothing very coherent can be said about how balance is to be
achieved. This lacuna in elementary textbooks is later addressed with the aid of dynamic
programming, a decidedly advanced subject. The theory of optimal control, a modern
descendant of the calculus of variations used by Ramsey (1928), provides the basis for
analysing a general equilibrium stock–flow analysis of supply and demand, linking
quantities and prices through time. This is the main tool of analysis in graduate level
textbooks on macroeconomic theory. Its relationship to Arrow–Debreu general equilibrium
theory is carefully investigated by Burgstaller (1994[2010]) who shows, in a broad class of
models, that solution paths are generically unstable. Doubts are occasionally expressed
concerning the relevance of this theory for an understanding of how a capitalist market
economy actually works.6 The less formal but more nuanced discussions of stock/flow
relationships in the work of our six Cambridge economists provide a more robust antidote.

3.1 Marshall
In The Economics of Industry, written with his wife Mary Paley, and more particularly in his
Principles, Marshall ‘examined production by way of its [four] agents, that is, land, labour,
capital and organisation . . . [defining] these agents by indicating that labour and nature,
the more basic classification, gave rise to the other two agents, capital and organisation, as
produced agents’ (AM, p. 108). In the earlier work also, ‘Agents of production . . . are
defined first in terms of man and his environment (man and nature or, more narrowly,
labour and land)’ (AM, p. 57). There is no suggestion that capital is an original factor of
production. And, neither is organisation. What is emphasised is that the flow of work
depends on the characteristics of the stock of labour and the natural environment (AM, p.
57). To the extent that some elements of nature constitute a fixed stock, all progress
depends on ‘the growth of that knowledge and those ideas which are incomparably the
most important form of collective wealth’ (Marshall, 1907, p. 22). This together with the
economic virtues—the moral character of the labouring classes and the ‘chivalrous and
noble’ (Marshall, 1907, p. 25) nature of many, but by no means all business dealings—are
always in the back of Marshall’s mind as he theorises about the ordinary business of
life. Accumulation and development of new instruments of capital and new forms of
organisation are the means by which the growth of technical knowledge and the
enhancement of virtue are sustained.
Some assets, essential in the just right amounts to ensure ongoing efficiency, are perhaps
too easily created and too easily destroyed. In a passage from The Economics of Industry,7
6

For an especially clear and candid statement, see the concluding section of Samuelson (1967).
Groenewegen refers to the ‘rarity of the actual text’ of The Economics of Industry, now available in its 1881
edition as a downloadable Google Book.
7
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Groenewegen includes Marshall’s yet modern sounding comments on the destabilising
swings of trust and confidence over the course of the business cycle: ‘As credit by growing
makes itself grow, so when distrust has taken the place of confidence, failure and panic
breed panic and failure’ (Marshall and Marshall, 1879[1881], p. 63). Other assets become
embedded in the bureaucracies of business organisations, which Marshall always feared
becoming sclerotic and inhibitive of enterprise.

3.2 Keynes
Although Keynesian economics is routinely introduced by focusing the student’s attention
entirely on flows—production, income, expenditure—and their relationship as seen
through the multiplier, a broad conception of the role of stocks in the economy provides
a better starting point. Keynes took the physical stock of capital goods as a given in the
short period. But, as Davidson has long emphasised, positions in assets must be financed
by liabilities and so in the foreground of his understanding of Keynes are all the associated
cash commitments. It was the beneficial predictability of cash commitments that underlay
Keynes’s focus on the need for price stability in A Tract on Monetary Reform and so the need
for central bank action to ‘offset unanticipated changes in the public’s desire to hold money
as a store of value’ (JMK, p. 15).
Appeals to ‘sticky prices’, in the modern vernacular, take for granted that the unemployment problem can be solved by bringing the flow demand for work into line with the
flow supply of work by altering wages. ‘Keynes argued that the persistent unemployment
was not the fault of the unemployed or intransigence of workers to accept lower wages or
the result of market imperfections such as monopolies or trade unions’ (JMK, p. 21), all
getting in the way of the balancing of flows. ‘Rather, the cause was nested in the public’s
desire for liquidity and the peculiar but essential properties possessed by money and other
liquid assets’ (JMK, p. 21). Weak market demand for the flow of output could not easily be
corrected by ‘getting the prices right’ because of the existing structure of balance sheets,
reflecting past financing of positions in stocks of real assets, accompanied by binding cash
flow commitments or, more generally, ‘high carrying costs’ (JMK, p. 50). In the face
of weak demand, all then seek protection ‘by spending a portion of . . . income on the
purchase of money and other liquid assets. These liquid assets, though not the products of
industry, provide the utility of security in that with sufficient liquidity they can meet any
unforeseen substantial contractual obligations in the uncertain future’ (JMK, p. 46).
Throughout Keynes, Davidson focuses on the asset price effects of a waxing and waning
fear of illiquidity and the role, not just of the central bank, but of all the main financial
market makers in bringing it to heel. In his postscript on the recent financial crisis, this
theme is reiterated.

3.3 Robertson
Robertson would also struggle to understand the workings of the business cycle through an
analysis of interacting stocks and flows. ‘In considering fluctuations in general trade,
Robertson describes himself as ‘‘breaking at some point arbitrarily into the magic circle of
industrial change’’ (Robertson, 1915, p. 121) . . . at the point of revival . . . [from which] the
rest of the process will follow’ (DR, p. 73). A rise in demand in some particular market
increases profits for existing firms. But, how many new firms will enter and on what scale?
Robertson argued that the longer it takes to build up a stock of new capacity, the greater the
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chance for error.8 In what might be called Robertson’s version of ‘real business cycle’
theory, there is a waste of consumption because of over-investment during the upswing and
a denial of compensating consumption during the slump as fresh sacrifices are made in
preparation for the coming boom. His whole approach to thinking about the costs of the
business cycle turns thus on an inefficient pattern of the flow of consumption induced by
the innate urge to accumulate stocks.
Robertson’s recommendations for taming the cycle were set forth in his 1926 Banking
Policy and the Price Level, ‘concise and forbidding, devoid of charm and whimsy and
employing in its important chapters a terminology replete with neologisms amounting
almost to a private language’ (DR, p. 125). That private language remains a barrier to
understanding. Fletcher is determined to make it all clear and, in the process, to reveal the
sense in which Robertson intends to ensure that money remains neutral:
In Robertson’s scheme, banks play their part . . . as facilitators, enabling savers to realise their
intentions by transforming spontaneous new hoarding into applied lacking by restoring the price
level. In this way, price stability is maintained and individuals retain the initiative of choice between
present enjoyment and provision for the future. [The banks also play the role of] plunderers,
raising the price level and forcing a reduction in consumption to meet what the authorities deem
the long-term social interest. (DR, p. 135, emphasis added)

In the event of an increase in hoarding, proper banking policy ‘‘‘imposes Automatic
Stinting: considered in conjunction with the New Hoarding, it nips in the bud the
Automatic Splashing which would otherwise occur as a by-product of the New Hoarding.
The bank, therefore, while imposing Automatic Stinting is not imposing Automatic
Lacking, but is in effect transforming Spontaneous New Hoarding into Applied Lacking
. . .’’ (Robertson, 1926, pp. 53–4)’ (DR, p. 137). Fletcher concludes:
[Robertson’s] elaborate apparatus, based on a sleight of hand [fails, in the end, to maintain the]
orthodox sequence at all. When Robinson Crusoe decides to build a boat or a jetty to increase his
chances of catching fish, he perforce chooses to reduce consumption as a means of accumulating
a sufficient stock of food to carry him through the investment period . . . By contrast, Robertson’s
hapless public choose to reduce consumption in order to accumulate money hoards—not to
engage in investment . . . Individual choice and the saving-drives-investment sequence . . . are lost.
(DR, p. 137–38)

3.4 Sraffa
Roncaglia devotes considerable space to Sraffa’s robust defense of Keynes in ‘a markedly
critical review of Prices and Production [in which Hayek had argued that] a policy in support
of demand for consumption goods . . . proves counterproductive’ (PS, pp. 30–33). Sraffa’s
argument turned on recognising the importance of financial stocks in the short run. He
‘points out that Hayek’s argument fails to take into account certain features typical of
a monetary economy, where money is not only a means of payment but also a unit of
measurement in contracts and a store of value. . .’ (PS, p. 33). Most intriguing is Hayek’s
reaction to Sraffa’s observation that when relative prices are changing, each commodity
‘has its ‘‘own rate of interest’’, defined as the interest paid on the money necessary to buy
spot a unit of the commodity added to the (positive or negative) difference between spot
and forward prices of the commodity, in per cent’ (PS, p. 33). Hayek argues ‘that ‘‘there
8
Such difficulties were the subject of G. B. Richardson’s Information and Investment (1961[1997]),
recently the subject of renewed interest (see Foss and Loasby, 1998).
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might, at any moment, be as many ‘natural’ interest rates as there are commodities, all of
which would be equilibrium rates’’ (Hayek, 1932, p. 245)’ (PS, p. 34). Roncaglia cites
Milgate (1979) in support of the claim that Hayek’s anticipation of intertemporal
equilibrium theory, ‘amounts to renouncing the idea of automatic mechanisms ensuring
a tendency to a macroeconomic equilibrium of the economy’ (PS, p. 34). Here, one comes
into direct contact with modern macroeconomic theory, in which stocks of real assets and
their prices follow an unstable but convergent saddle-path, a path that can only be reached
if initial asset prices are pre-set to ensure that all capital values subsequently follow an
equilibrium path. Roncaglia concludes: ‘Today it appears quite clear that what to Hayek
seemed like nihilism on the part of Sraffa was simply rejection of the marginalist approach
. . . in favour of a reconstruction of political economy based on the alternative approach of
the classical school’ (PS, p. 34).
It is striking that the alternative approach Roncaglia speaks of virtually denies a role for
stocks, apart from non-reproducible land. Indeed, he draws a line from Ricardo to Sraffa,
without even mentioning land: ‘Sraffa stresses the importance of the notion of surplus, and
of the conception of the economic system as a circular flow of production and consumption, which Ricardo inherited from an already robust school of thought: suffice it here
to recall William Petty (1623–87) for the concept of surplus and Francxois Quesnay (1694–
1774) for the idea of a circular flow’ (PS, p. 37). This emphasis on flows explains why the
prototypical Sraffian model is one of circulating capital, in which stocks all turn over within
the period of production, but even when fixed capital is considered by Sraffa, partially
used-up capital goods are treated as output flows rather than depreciated stocks.9 Thus,
in addition to land, the only stocks in the analysis are out-dated, no-longer-produced
inputs whose rents are determined by prices of production, at the assumed uniform rate of
profit, using ‘a ‘‘reference technology’’ [relative to which the] ‘‘dominated’’ techniques still
in use correspond to investment carried out in the past, which would not be chosen today’
(PS, p. 53).
In concluding that ‘Sraffa provides the tools for a radical, and indeed destructive, critique’
(PS, p. 57) of marginalist theory, Roncaglia sounds a recurring theme: ‘It has been argued
that this criticism does not apply to the modern theory of general economic equilibrium . . .
However, as early as 1926 Sraffa points out that the general equilibrium approach is in its
generality utterly sterile’ (PS, p. 57, emphasis added). At other points, too, Roncaglia merely
ridicules general equilibrium theory: ‘Thus, in Debreu’s (1959) general equilibrium
analysis there is no reason not to speak of angels (or demons, or avatars) instead of
economic agents, and of souls to be saved or damned (to lower or higher circles of hell or
paradise depending on the evaluations of the angels themselves) instead of commodities’
(PS, p. 98). It is natural to question the meaning of an analytical framework in which goods
and services are defined by their natural properties, date and location of delivery, and
the state of nature in which such delivery is made at the same time that a continuum of
traders is assumed to exist for all such minutely defined inputs and outputs at a single point
in time when all equilibrium transactions, stretching out over an indefinite future, are
consummated! The stock/flow problem suggests a more transparent line of attack.
As earlier noted, Burgstaller (1994[2010]) analysed the connection between an Arrow–
Debreu general equilibrium of supply and demand and the Hamiltonian dynamics typical
9
Kurz and Salvadori (2003) defend the ‘flow–flow’ approach to the analysis of choice of technique in the
presence of fixed capital, arguing that by reducing fixed capital to circulating capital, errors that might
otherwise occur in solving for a cost-minimising technique are avoided.

984

H. Gram

of stock/flow equilibrium. His work made clear that the mainstream analysis of a
‘mechanism to ensure a uniform rate of return on all the various capital goods’ (PS, p.
57) is haunted by an inherent instability.10 Roncaglia argues that Sraffa’s ‘extreme
theoretical nihilism’ (PS, p. 34, n. 19) towards such theories, the beginnings of which may
be traced to the work of Hicks (cf. Garegnani, 1976), Hayek and Lindahl in the 1930s, was
part and parcel of his reconstruction of political economy based on the alternative
approach of the classical school, but the precise connection between that nihilism and
rejection of what he frequently characterises as a hopelessly complex and sterile general
equilibrium theory is left unexamined. What is at stake is enormous: the existence of an
inverse relationship between the real wage and the overall labour intensity of production.
Sraffa’s analysis provided the basis for showing, in general, that no such relationship exists.

3.5 Robinson
Robinson’s struggles with time, with her neoclassical adversaries, and with her Sraffian
colleagues all turned on the stock/flow problem. It began in earnest with her efforts to
develop a long period Keynesian theory. ‘She wrote an article about the Hayek/Keynes
exchanges in 1931 . . . not published until 1933’ (JR, p. 24) in which:
short period equilibria converge over ‘time’ on the long-period position, the full stock/flow
equilibrium in which normal profits and wages are received. . . . But . . . there is concern with the
process of price formation in, first, markets where flows dominate stocks, and, secondly, in
markets where stocks dominate flows and, thirdly, the vital importance of having a class of
speculative traders who take views on the future course of market prices while not being
producers of the commodities concerned themselves. In the context of the exchanges between
Hayek and Keynes, it is the consumption goods trades that are characterised by the first sort of
market, the capital goods trade, by the second, and the market for securities, by the third factor.
(JR, pp. 24–25)

Twenty years later, such concerns were central to her critique (Robinson, 1953) of the
production function and the theory of capital which led up to The Accumulation of Capital.
In the latter work:
Joan Robinson makes utterly clear that ‘everything that happens in an economy happens in
a short-period situation, for an event occurs or a decision is taken at a particular time [when] the
physical stock of capital is what it is’ (Robinson, 1956, p. 180). But there are long-period as well
as short-period aspects of all happenings . . . the short-period aspect of accumulation is to be
a major determinant of aggregate demand, while the long-period aspects concern the rate of
growth of productive capacity . . . and the technique of production. (JR, pp. 93–94)

She was equally clear in her rejection of the equilibrium analysis of a process of
accumulation. Her initial attack is one part of her critique of 1953, excised from the
original and reprinted in the second volume of her Collected Economic Papers,11 where it is
followed by a definitive and polished 1959 version. The other part, about half of the
original paper, is what attracted all the attention.
Harcourt and Prue devote a chapter to Robinson’s critique of 1953, which marked the
beginning of the ‘Cambridge–Cambridge debates in the theory of capital’ (JR, p. 89). The
10
This had been granted by Hahn (1966) and Samuelson (1967) and may be inferred from Dorfman et al.
(1958, pp. 321–22).
11
The removal of large chunks of the original article—there is only one transitional passage added to the
reprinted version—with no affect on the flow of the argument, makes one wonder how the original paper was
put together.

Six titans of the Cambridge School

985

lack of any systematic relation between the rate of profit (uniform across all activities under
pressure of competition) and the relative capital intensity of the economy as a whole—a key
result of those debates—was seen as undermining the mainstream interpretation of factor
prices as measures of relative factor scarcity. One side considered it a knock-out blow. The
other retreated to stock/flow, intertemporal equilibrium models in which certain notions of
‘conservation of capital value’ can be entertained (Samuelson, 1990).
For Robinson, the stock/flow problem and its connection to the problem of ‘getting into
equilibrium’ had always been paramount, but this was not central to the thinking of her
Marxian colleagues. Dobb, in responding to ‘her attempt to ‘‘translate’’ Marx’s dialectical
argument by reducing it to a propositional system based on static concepts and deductive
logic . . . reiterated his disapproval: ‘‘I’m afraid I’ve never been able quite to see the fuss
about this stock-flow problem . . .’’’ (JR, p. 37).
Robinson joined ‘with Naqvi in 1967 . . . [in] her last intervention in the reswitching and
capital-reversing debates as an analyst of the technical issues themselves. From then on,
she increasingly stressed the other strand of the critical arguments (in which she was joined
by economists within the neoclassical camp, especially Christopher Bliss and Franklin
Fisher) about using differences to analyse changes’ (JR, p. 113). Harcourt and Prue cite
‘the particularly forceful statement of this view in her 1974 paper, ‘‘History versus
equilibrium’’’ (JR, p. 113). That there was no meeting of minds became clear in her 1975
article on the ‘The unimportance of reswitching’ to which she appended Samuelson’s
response in its reprinted version (Robinson, 1979, pp. 76–89). Rather than recognising
and elaborating upon the obvious connection between her concerns about ‘getting into
equilibrium’ and the ‘Hahn problem’, Samuelson merely suggests at the end of a long
footnote that ‘the vast literature’ on the stock/flow problem be consulted. In view of his own
candid assessment in the conclusion of Samuelson (1967), this seemed disingenuous (see
Gram, 2009).

3.6 Kaldor
Complex relationships between stocks and flows—in particular, between the stock of
knowledge of production techniques and the flow of learning as part of the development
process—were recurring themes in Kaldor’s numerous writings on circular and cumulative
causation. He was surprised, too, at how elastic the stock/flow relationship could be. In an
‘excursion into national income accounting, written with his Hungarian colleague Tibor
Barna,. . . [Kaldor noted how Britain’s wartime] ‘‘performance greatly exceeded the
promise. The latent reserves of our peace-time economy system have proved to be greater
than even the most optimistically . . . minded observer could have expected’’’ (NK, p. 44).
Another paper, ‘arguably the best’ (NK, p. 27) of Kaldor’s early work focused on
stabilising/destabilising effects of speculation in stock markets. In traditional theory, ‘the
existence of speculators enables the system to behave with more foresight than the average
individual in the system possesses. . . .The possibility that speculative activity might . . . lead
to the transfer of goods from more to less important uses, was not seriously
contemplated. . .’ (Kaldor, 1939B, p. 1). Recalling chapter 12 of The General Theory,
Kaldor saw that speculators could live off themselves while losing as a group (Kaldor,
1939B, p. 2), but his main purpose was to show that ‘speculation, in so far as it succeeds in
eliminating price fluctuations will, in many cases, generate fluctuations in the level of
incomes. Its stabilising influence on price will be accompanied by a de-stabilising influence
on activity’ (Kaldor, 1939B, p. 2). Kaldor was not cited when others took up the same

986

H. Gram

question in a formal analysis of stock–flow equilibrium, and came to the same conclusion
(Jorgenson, 1960, p. 893).
King recalls Hicks’s comment to Kaldor that his 1939 article on speculation ‘was ‘‘the
culmination of the Keynesian revolution in theory.’’ . . . Kaldor remained justifiably proud
of the paper, which convincingly analysed real-world capitalist markets where stocks
dominate flows. . .’ (NK, p. 30). King describes the paper as ‘an important—if
unheralded—contribution to the theory of finance’ (NK, p. 28). At the same time, he
observes in connection with Kaldor’s analysis of the trade cycle, published just a year later:
‘It is as if ‘‘Speculation and Economic Stability’’ had been written by someone else
altogether’ (NK, p. 32). Still, by ‘drawing a very long bow it is just possible to detect [in an
even early paper (Kaldor, 1932)] . . . an early version of Hyman Minsky’s theory of financial
instability (Minsky, 1986), in which the operating losses of bank-owned industrial
enterprises in Austria forced them into a ‘‘vicious circle’’ of Ponzi finance, borrowing
repeatedly to cover their commitments from previous loans’ (NK, p. 18).

4. Epistemics and economics
Our six Cambridge economists also reflected on the relationship between knowledge,
novelty, and the science of wealth. In every case, it is the creative, dynamic production
paradigm rather than the allocative, static exchange paradigm (cf. Pasinetti, 2007) that
directed their thinking about ‘knowing’.

4.1 Marshall
In ‘Ye Machine’, an early philosophical paper, Marshall ‘relied on associationist and
evolutionist neuropsychology and neurophysiology . . . to shed light on the mechanical
impact of the nature of sensations, ideas and actions . . . Brain (ideas) and body (actions)
are represented by the machine’s wheels connected with bands (the nervous system) . . .
simultaneous actions akin to . . . the calculating automaton proposed by Charles Babbage . . .
give the machine access to language, communications, arithmetical operations and geometry’ (AM, pp. 35–6). What was beyond its capabilities was creative activity. In claiming
that this early foray into psychology and the mind/body problem had ‘implications for
Marshall’s subsequent intellectual development’ (AM, pp. 35–6), Groenewegen anticipates
Marshall’s enduring fascination with increasing returns to scale.
Groenewegen tries to save Marshall from his proselytisers, noting that he did not assume
perfect competition ‘as a realistic notion of market structure’ (AM, p. 4); and, in Industry
and Trade, ‘warned that the line of division between competitive business and monopoly is
very indistinct in practice. . . ‘ (AM, p. 154). He also makes numerous references to Book
IV of the Principles, which included five chapters on industrial organisation. ‘Book IV . . .
embodied the fruits of Marshall’s factual research in factories . . . This enabled him to turn
production economics into a broad analysis of industrial organisation, productivity and
industrial leadership . . .’ (AM, p. 154). Industry and Trade also includes chapters on
business organisation: ‘Financial, administrative and creative skills are all crucial attributes
for sound management . . .’ (AM, p. 156).
Capital and organisation are produced ‘agents’ of production, evolving unpredictably
as the scale of industrial activity expands. Marshall attempted to reconcile ‘increasing
returns . . ., [a] beneficial tendency in business organisation . . . with maintaining
a competitive economy’ (AM, p. 7) by invoking a life cycle of firms. This prompted
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strenuous and sustained debate in the pages of the Economic Journal and elsewhere. More
recently, there has been an enormous outpouring of work in evolutionary economics.
Loasby (1998) is especially helpful in drawing out the many ways in which Marshall, from
his earliest work on a multi-level brain (Raffaelli, 1994), came to regard the ‘‘‘business man
endowed with genius’’ . . . [as] especially skilful in devising experiments . . . As Smith . . .
knew, patterns are invented and imposed on phenomena . . . what matters is always the next
trial, and the result of that can never be guaranteed’ (Loasby, 1998, p. 144). In the classical
heritage of Marshall, one finds a rich vein from which a modern theory of the firm might be
developed, bypassing the production function as a summary statement of available
technical knowledge, freely accessible to all (cf. Loasby, 2010).

4.2 Keynes
Hayek’s Prices and Production, though described by Keynes as ‘‘‘one of the most frightful
muddles I have every read . . . must set the reader thinking’’’ (JMK, p. 24). Davidson cites
the well known passage from a letter Keynes had written to Harrod: ‘‘‘I accuse the classical
economic theory of being itself one of these pretty, polite techniques which tries to deal
with the present by abstracting from the fact that we know very little about the future. . .’’’
(JMK, p. 34). When decision makers ‘recognise that they do not ‘‘know’’ and cannot know
the future in a statistically reliable sense . . . it is . . . sensible to store some portion of their
income in . . . liquid assets that can be readily converted into money, as long as future
liabilities can be expected to be legally discharged by the tendering of money’ (JMK, p. 54).
Keynes drew his oft-repeated conclusion:
Our decisions to do something positive, the full consequence of which will be drawn out over
many days to come, can only be taken as a result of animal spirits—of a spontaneous urge to
action rather than inaction . . . If the animal spirits are dimmed and the spontaneous optimism
falters . . . enterprise will fade and die;—though fears of loss may have a basis no more reasonable
than hopes of profit had before. (JMK, p. 64)

The source of true uncertainty in a monetary-production economy is rooted in the fact
that ‘decision makers create . . . the future’ (JMK, p. 112). Davidson cites Shackle’s
‘concept of crucial choice . . . where a decision is made that changes forever the economic
environment . . . The future is transmutable in that it is created by crucial choice decisions
although the future that is created is often not precisely what anyone intended’ (JMK, p. 112).
Crucial choices arise frequently because no decision is fully reversible. Failure of the
ergodic axiom in a world in which the future is transmutable should not be regretted,
despite the havoc it wreaks on macro-econometrics,12 for the simple reason that it provides
what is unavailable in mainstream models: ‘an analytical rationale for the existence of fixed
money contracts and non-neutral money’ (JMK, p. 113). Ipso facto, it justifies ‘a permanent
role for the government to work with the private sector to improve the economic
performance of markets . . . to develop economic institutions . . . to limit future outcomes
to those that are closely compatible with full employment and reasonable price stability’
(JMK, pp. 114–15).

12
Davidson cites Keynes’s criticism of Tinbergen’s econometric methodology and notes that ‘nonhomogeneity of data [through time] is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition, for a non-ergodic process’
(JMK, p. 203, n. 7).
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4.3 Robertson
During the 1920s, the fashion took hold among academic writers in Cambridge of drawing
inspiration from the works of Lewis Carroll (pseudonym of Charles Lutwidge Dodgson).
By all accounts, Robertson turned it into an art form (DR, p. 100). Fletcher’s rather
different conclusion is that: ‘What Robertson found in the [‘Alice’] books was . . .
a practical philosophy for facing up to life—to the harsh realities of human existence’
(DR, p. 102). Dodgson, ‘a Victorian clergyman and Oxford mathematics don . . .,
[conjured] a universe that is both God-less and meaningless, cold and uncaring. In . . .
the ‘Alice’ stories, it is necessary for our hero to assume a strategy for survival and sanity of
mind: she must be brave, keep smiling, create a system of order and meaning . . . an effect
that is warm and reassuring’ (DR, p. 103). The form of the stories is ‘a self-contained game
played by known rules . . . a simplified form of life in which possible outcomes are limited
and known’ (DR, p. 103). Fletcher maintains that: ‘The (Classical) Cambridge economics
of Robertson’s day . . . was built on a foundation of atomistic, frictionless barter. This, like
‘nonsense’, was made up of discrete elements, of which any total could be no more than the
sum of the parts. . . . money was of little consequence, being seen as merely a veil . . .’ (DR,
p. 104). Keynes, ‘in recognising the uncertainty of the real world . . . destroyed the gamelike quality of classical economics . . . [introducing] theoretical devices that produced totals
. . . different from the sum of the parts’ (DR, p. 104).
Fletcher’s closely argued thesis is the remarkable claim that: ‘With [the Keynesian
Revolution] went Robertson’s professional roots and his emotional security: no wonder he
remained obdurate in the face of Keynes’s triumph’ (DR, p. 104). A sympathetic reader
must digest the whole of Robertson before passing judgment on ‘the equivalence, as unitive
elements, of love (with respect to ‘Alice’) and money (with respect to economics) . . . also
the equivalence of the one big ‘One’ (with respect to Walt Whitman) and the doctrine of
organic unity (with respect to Moore) and its economic manifestations’ (DR, p. 176). What
all readers can discern in the poetry of Robertson’s economics is the fact that ‘crucial’
investment decisions create both order and disorder, transmuting the future. ‘Knowing’
within the ‘nonsense game’ of a dynamic general equilibrium of supply and demand is no
substitute for creating institutions capable of taming the potential chaos, although their
existence may well create an illusion that no such controls are necessary. Robertson had no
such illusions despite what ended up, in Fletcher’s account, as a psychological aversion to
the revolution wrought by Keynes.

4.4 Sraffa
Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities is a notably austere work, sometimes
defended on the grounds that it is concerned strictly with the measureable and ‘objective’
facts of economic life as opposed to what is internal to the mind and therefore ‘subjective’,
but this does not solve the epistemic problem of knowing what the facts are. ‘Sraffa gives no
direct indication concerning the problem of the type of technology in use’ (PS, p. 52).
Roncaglia, after noting the influence of ‘socio-political factors . . . on the technical
coefficients of production’ (PS, p. 53), states that ‘a concrete concept of a ‘‘reference
technology’’, should not in itself be considered as an objection . . . in principle, at least, the
technology can be identified’ (PS, p. 53). And yet, the circular flow of production of
commodities by means of commodities depends on what firms know about production.
How this knowledge (whether true or false) is acquired, how it is preserved, changed, or
lost ought to be central theoretical concerns. Loasby (1989) is referred to by Roncaglia
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(PS, p. 20) as playing down the importance of the critique of Marshall in Sraffa
(1925[1986], 1926, 1930), but Loasby, (1998, 1999[2002], 2010) has had so much more
to say about how production knowledge and institutions evolve. His lead may well provide
a most fruitful direction in which those engaged in a revival of the great themes of classical
economics should direct their energies.

4.5 Robinson
Throughout her later writings, in particular, Robinson comes right up to the point where
epistemic questions arise. One such paper (Robinson, 1977A), widely read and cited by
Harcourt and Prue (JR, pp. 113–15), provides several points of reference. In it, she refers
to Shackle in a critical vein: he ‘treated ‘‘high theory’’ as a purely intellectual movement’
(Robinson, 1979, p. 1), failing to recognise the connection between her Keynesian
insistence on the importance of uncertainty and Shackle’s mature work (Shackle,
1972[1991]) in which an unknowable, transmutable future is created by ‘crucial’
investment decisions. She remarks upon ‘the exploration of imperfect and monopolistic
competition set afoot by the challenge from opposite directions, of Piero Sraffa (1926) and
Young (1928)’ (Robinson, 1979, p. 1), but does not elaborate Young’s perspective on the
growth of knowledge (cf. Loasby, 1998, p. 142). She cites a discussion paper by Loasby:
‘The full information required to make a correct choice can never be available because of
the inescapable fact that ‘‘the basic data simply do not exist, and cannot exist, no matter
what information is devised’’’ (Robinson, 1979, p. 7), yet seems unaware of his first book
on epistemic questions in economics (Loasby, 1976). She notes the disruptive effects of
learning, citing Norbert Weiner: ‘‘‘. . .even the first skyscraper made of aluminium instead
of steel will turn out to affect the whole future demand for structural steel, as the first diesel
ship did the unquestioned dominance of the steamship’’’ (Robinson, 1979, p. 3–4), but
associates this mainly with the problems faced by statisticians in collecting time series data
of uniform significance. She applauds Morgenstern (1972): ‘Competition means struggle,
fight, maneuvering, bluff, hiding of information—and precisely that word is used to
describe a situation in which no one has any influence on anything . . .’ (Robinson, 1979, p.
6), but relegates to a footnote Penrose (1959[2009]) and Eichner (1976) who were both
concerned with the process by which firms create new products and discover new processes
of production. Even Marshall is under-appreciated. In another paper (Robinson, 1977B, p.
62), his ‘factors of production’ are listed as land, labour and waiting (as opposed to
capital), with the notable omission of the fourth—organisation.
Harcourt and Prue emphasise that, for Robinson, equilibrium was a barrier to
understanding: ‘‘‘As soon as the uncertainty of the expectations that guide economic
behaviour is admitted, equilibrium drops out of the argument and history takes its
place. . .’’ (Robinson, 1974)’ (JR, p. 114). Presumptions about knowledge were central to
her complaints about all theory. Most were directed to her neoclassical protagonists, but
she was just as insistent that realised expectations were central to Sraffa’s analysis of prices
of production (Robinson, 1977B). This left her isolated from both camps. Perhaps if she
had taken up the epistemic questions raised by Young (1928), Penrose (1959[2009]),
Richardson (1961[1997]), Shackle (1972[1991]), and Loasby (1976), all of whose work
now underlies a burgeoning literature,13 the robustness of her complaints, never fairly
13
There are new editions of Penrose (1959), Richardson (1961), and Shackle (1972), published,
respectively, in 2009, 1997 and 1991; and collections of papers on Penrose (Pitelis, 2002), Richardson (Foss
and Loasby, 1998), Shackle (Earl and Frowen, 2000), and Loasby (Dow and Earl, 1999), whose award
winning 1999 Graz/Schumpeter Lectures were republished in paperback in 2002.
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answered, would have served to build more robust links between Keynes, Sraffa and that
other titan of twentieth century economics, Schumpeter.

4.6 Kaldor
The London School of Economics was Kaldor’s academic base from 1927 to 1947 during
which time ‘he came under the influence first of the idiosyncratic American Marshallian,
Allyn A. Young, and then of Young’s charismatic successor to the chair of Economics,
Lionel Robbins, [who] absorbed the Austrian variant of general equilibrium theory during
his time in Vienna under Ludwig von Mises. . . . Hayek, . . . [at the time] a convinced
neoclassical of the Walras–Wicksell variety . . . briefly . . . had a profound impact on Kaldor.
. . . Among his closest friends were . . . the future Noble laureate John Hicks. . . . young
colleagues included Thomas Balogh . . ., Paul Rosenstein-Rodan and . . . Tibor Scitovsky.
. . . Kaldor began a friendship with John von Neumann. . . Hicks . . . introduced Kaldor to
the Swedish school and . . . ‘‘made me such an easy convert to Keynes’’’ (NK, pp. 4–7). And
these are just a few highlights of the trilingual Kaldor’s pre-Cambridge academic life! King
recalls the influence of Young (1928):
in one of his own earliest and most original papers (Kaldor, 1934), and [how Kaldor] returned to
the implications of increasing returns over and over again in the final two decades of his life. . . .
Young ‘showed that the main function of markets is to transmit impulses to economic change,
and thereby create more resources through enlarging the scope of specialisation and the division
of labour—rather than to secure an optimum allocation of a given quantity of resources. And he
also showed that with increasing returns continuing change is self-generated and propagates itself
in a cumulative way. Hence no analysis which describes the forces operating on the economy as
tending towards a state of equilibrium can capture the manner in which the development of
markets make[s] for perpetual change’ (Kaldor, 1978, p. xxv). (NK, p. 5)

The Austrian influence had always alerted Kaldor to the fact that ‘it is only by means of
a ‘‘theory of the path’’ (a theory showing what determines the actual path followed) that a
causal-genetic approach can arrive at generalisations concerning the nature of equilibrium’’ (Kaldor, 1934, p. 128)’ (NK, p. 21). Twenty years later, he sounded a distinctly
Robertsonian theme:
. . .it is the strength and duration of booms which shapes the trend rate of growth. It is the
economy in which business-men are reckless and speculative, where expectations are highly
volatile, but with an underlying bias towards optimism . . . which is likely to show a higher rate of
progress over longer periods; while it is an economy of sound and cautious business-men, who
are slow at reacting to current events, which is likely to grow at a slow rate (Kaldor, 1954, pp. 68–
69). (NK, p. 61).

His 1957 full employment growth model and the Mark II version (with Mirrlees) both
made technical progress the main engine of economic growth, but there is only ‘a hint . . . that
Kaldor was beginning to ponder the reasons for . . . slow . . . growth’ (NK, p. 71). Finally, in
what King calls the Mark III version, there reappears the old theme ‘of increasing returns to
scale, which had been stressed by Adam Smith, by Alfred Marshall and above all by Kaldor’s
old LSE professor, Allyn Young. . . . increasing returns . . . were related to the growth of
output, not the level of output. They were connected with learning, which was itself
the product of experience, and they were a ‘‘macro-phenomenon’’, since each industry
benefited from the expansion not just of its own output but of output as a whole’ (NK, p. 73).
It is surprising that Kaldor drew no connection between the creative functions of
markets and Shackle’s concept of the ‘crucial’ investment decision, nor is the resource
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creating hypothesis of Penrose (1959[2009]) referred to at the point where it fits in
so well:
When every change in the use of resources—every reorganisation of productive activities—
creates the opportunity for a further change which would not have existed otherwise, the notion of
an ‘optimum’ allocation . . . becomes a meaningless and contradictory notion: the pattern of the
use of resources at any one time can be no more than a link in the chain of an unending sequence
and the very distinction, vital to equilibrium economics, between resource-creation and
resource-allocation loses its validity. (Kaldor, 1972, p. 1245)

The explanation may simply be that ‘Kaldor . . . ‘‘was never an avid reader’’ (Thirlwall,
1987, p. 24)’ (NK, p. 166).

5. Conclusion
The accomplishments of our six titans of Cambridge economics are recorded and
expounded upon in the Great Thinkers in Economics series with great verve. Peter
Groenewegen, drawing on his celebrated 1995 biography, A Soaring Eagle, Alfred Marshall
1842–1924, and a vast amount of other work, remains dispassionate and scholarly,
preferring to evoke the richness of Marshall’s legacy than to enter into Marshallian
controversies. A great strength of his book is the connections it allows one to make with the
developing field of evolutionary economics. Paul Davidson writes in an altogether different
style about ‘the greatest thinker in economics in the 20th century’ (JMK, p. xiii). He
admits openly to presenting a gloss on Keynes, found throughout his own writing, but not
found in The General Theory (JMK, p. 35). Some will object to this approach to intellectual
biography and perhaps also to the space devoted to Davidson’s own ideas, even though
very much rooted in the economics of Keynes. Gordon Fletcher is touched by the tragic
aspects of his subject, drawing the reader into a convoluted tale of ‘duty and desire’. Its
twenty-three short chapters, drawn from a decade of work beginning with the published
version of his dissertation (Fletcher, 2000), pull the reader along, even through some dense
thickets. Alessandro Roncaglia strikes a confident note about the significance of Sraffa’s
distinction between basic and non-basic commodities but remains wary of interpretations
that have given prominence to prices of production as ‘centres of gravitation’. He is
perhaps too brief, certainly in comparison with The Wealth of Ideas (Roncaglia, 2005),
which draws on his understanding of the role played by Production of Commodities by Means
of Commodities in the revival of interest in the Classical economics of Smith, Ricardo and
Marx, and which received much acclaim when first published in Italian. Geoffrey Harcourt
and Prue Kerr, bringing together decades of earlier work and an intimate knowledge of
their subject, occasionally sound regretful that such a stalwart Keynesian did not fully
succeed in connecting the contradictions she found in theory with those that plague the
history of capitalism. John King, with reservations, often speaks in the very voice of his
hero, conveying Kaldor’s strongly argued positions and remaining to the end optimistic
about their enduring value.
In touching on just three related themes in this overview, much has been left for the
reader to discover, not least of which are the biographical details. Marshall’s attitude
towards the academic rights of women is not endearing (AM, pp. 133–37). Keynes found
in the fear of illiquidity the cause of the business cycle, but he had no such fear himself
(JMK, p. 9). Robertson was one of the most respected economists of his day, but this did
little to appease his personal longings or his dreams of the stage (DR, pp. 30–36). Sraffa,
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the cloistered academic, famous for keeping his own counsel, was both courageous and
politically astute (PS, pp. 6–9, 22–25). Robinson did not welcome the efforts, even of her
most attentive readers, to reduce her complex arguments to a formal model (JR, pp. 123–
26). Many dismissed her work on the grounds that their formalisations of it appeared
trivial, but this did nothing to reduce her appeal to generations of students who marvelled
at her dogged insistence on getting answers to her questions, not to mention her
longstanding antiwar positions (JR, pp. 218–20). Kaldor’s life story gives proof to the
thought that a single surviving son of a prosperous middle-class Jewish family (NK, p. 3),
surrounded in later life by adoring women, may just be an unstoppable force. Reports on
the consequences of following his policy advice, which was ever ready, became legendary
(NK, pp. 123–26).
It will come as a surprise to the modern student who reads these books that the
mathematical abilities of six economists who once dominated the field were either nil or
kept decidedly under wraps.14 None became enthralled with Walrasian general equilibrium
theory, the mainstay of modern mathematical economics—surely the most important fact
for the modern reader to bear in mind. It is essential for such a reader to make the
extraordinary effort required to give up the goal of formulating a complete theory15 and to
embrace instead those partial and open theories that leave space for ethical and moral
concerns; which reject the idea that a knowable future is (in probabilistic terms) fully
accounted for in present stock/flow equilibrium prices and quantities; and which open the
way to a recognition of the creative role that economic actors have in determining their own
future, for good or ill. That creative impulse, fuelled by scientific breakthroughs and the
urge to compete, generates a relentless flow of new, faster and often more fragmented ways
of producing both the familiar and the novel, transforming life in unimaginable ways while
knitting together in ever tenuous webs a vast international system of specialisation and
exchange. Sudden, unpredictable change in the values of stocks, both of goods and of
knowledge, create and destroy fortunes and lives, while subject to no obvious rules of the
game in a world of ever more unfathomable forms of financial contracting. The insistent
moral question, ‘Who is your neighbour?’ becomes impossible to contemplate, much less
to answer and so to establish a modern ethical foundation for economic theory. To the
extent that the Great Thinkers in Economics series opens the minds of those who have
become entranced, not so much by the formalism of modern economics, which is not to
be decried, as by its closedness—its inability to countenance a role for other disciplines
and to leave unanswerable questions unanswered, at least provisionally—the project that
Professor Thirlwall has undertaken will be the great success it deserves to be.
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